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1 ABSTRACT 
 
The article argues for an assimilation of the related doctrines of undue 
influence and unconscionable dealings under one common umbrella of 
unconscionability. The interrelationship between unconscionable bargains 
and undue influence under English law is considered in some detail, as 
well as developments in other Commonwealth jurisdictions, notably, in 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand. After examining the views of several 
academic commentators, the conclusion is that such an assimilation would 
do much to rationalise and simplify current English law. If, however, the 
English courts are reluctant to undertake what is perceived to be 
essentially a function of Parliament in developing the law, serious thought 
should be given to rationalising this area of law by means of legislative 
intervention.  
 
2 INTRODUCTION 
 
To what extent would it be desirable to subsume the doctrine of undue 
influence under a wider notion of unconscionability? Lord Denning MR, 
in the well-known case of Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bundy,1 attempted to bring 
together the law on duress, unconscionable bargains and undue influence 
under the one umbrella of “inequality of bargaining power”. In his 
formulation, the concepts unconscionability and exertion of excessive 
power or coercion by a stronger party over a weaker one, were to be 
regarded as key elements in establishing the basis for equity’s 
intervention.  
Unconscionability, however, as a unifying doctrine in the context of 
undue influence and unconscionable bargains has found little support in 
                                                     
* LLB (Hons), BCL (Oxon), ACIArb, SFHEA, Barrister, Professor of Property 
Law, School of Law, University of Greenwich. 
1 [1974] 3 All ER 757 (CA). See also, Arrale v Costain Civil Engineering Ltd 
[1976] Lloyd’s Rep 98 (CA); Levison v Patent Steam Carpet Cleaning Co [1978] 
QB 69 (CA); Avon Finance Co Ltd v Bridger [1985] 2 All ER 281 (CA), where 
Lord Denning MR had occasion to repeat his formulation. 
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the English case law on the ground that the need for a more general 
formulation of principle (such as that enunciated by Lord Denning in 
Bundy) is a matter of legislative reform rather than judicial development.2 
However, not all judges have agreed. In Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland 
NV v Burch,3 Nourse LJ appears to have accepted4 that unconscionable 
bargains and cases involving undue influence may come under the general 
heading of “inequality of bargaining power”, citing Balcombe LJ's 
judgment in the earlier case of Backhouse v Backhouse. 5  Again, in 
Langton v Langton,6  Mr AWH Charles QC (sitting as a deputy High 
Court judge) opined that the rationale underlying the doctrine of 
unconscionable bargains was closely linked to that behind a class 2b 
presumed undue influence relationship. He stated:7 
 
“... it seems to me that the 'unconscionable bargain' cases which 
arise as to particular transactions with poor and ignorant people 
could, and should, now be treated on the basis of, or by analogy 
to, the undue influence cases as one of the relationships where in 
all the circumstances a presumption that the transaction was 
procured by undue or improper influence arises and therefore has 
to be justified by the purchaser.” 
 
In the deputy judge's view, what underlies equity in both the presumed 
undue influence and unconscionable bargain cases “is the identification of 
a relationship which gives rise to a presumption that the donor, or 
recipient, should have the onus of establishing the righteousness of the 
transaction.”8 
 
3 UNCONSCIONABILITY IN OTHER AREAS OF EQUITY 
 
There have, undoubtedly, been other areas in equity which have 
benefitted from a rationalisation of principles under the one umbrella of 
unconscionability. An obvious example has been the willingness of the 
                                                     
2 See National Westminster Bank plc v Morgan [1985] 1 All ER 821 (HL) 830 
(Lord Scarman). 
3 [1997] 1 All ER 144 (CA). 
4 Ibid 151. 
5 [1978] 1 All ER 1158 (CA) 1166. 
6 [1995] 2 FLR 890. 
7 Ibid 908. 
8 Langdon (n 6) 909 
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English courts to adopt a broader-based doctrine of unconscionability as 
underlying proprietary estoppel claims and the personal liability of a 
stranger to a trust who has knowingly received trust property in breach of 
trust. The decisions in Gillett v Holt,9 Jennings v Rice10 and Campbell v 
Griffin11 in the context of proprietary estoppel and Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd v Akindele12 on the subject of 
receipt liability demonstrate the judiciary’s growing recognition that the 
concept of unconscionability provides a useful mechanism for affording 
equitable relief against the strict insistence on legal rights or unfair and 
oppressive conduct.  
In the context of imperfect gifts, the well-known principle in Milroy v 
Lord13 establishes that an attempted transfer of land or personalty, which 
does not meet the formal requirements of writing and registration, may 
take effect in equity provided that the transferor has done everything 
required of him and the only steps remaining to be done are to be 
performed by a third party. In these circumstances, the transferor will be 
treated as holding the legal title to the property as bare trustee for the 
transferee.14 However, more recently, the Court of Appeal in Pennington v 
Waine15 decided that where the donor had manifested an immediate and 
irrevocable intention to donate shares to another and had instructed her 
agent to execute the transfer, the donor would not be permitted to deny the 
interest acquired by the donee. Significantly, the transfer of shares in this 
case was treated as complete because it would be unconscionable for the 
transferor to recall the gift. The decision has not been without its critics 
not least because it is argued that the effectiveness of transfers of property 
should not be determined by the uncertainties associated with whether a 
court considers that it would be unconscionable for the donor to change 
his mind and seek to recall the gift.16 Other commentators, on the other 
hand, have welcomed this development emphasising the flexibility and 
                                                     
9 [2001] Ch 210 (CA). 
10 [2002] EWCA Civ 159 (CA). 
11  [2001] WTLR 981 (CA). See also, most recently, Ottey v Grundy [2003] 
EWCA Civ 1176. 
12 [2000] 4 All ER 221 (CA). 
13 (1862) 31 LJ Ch 798 (HL). 
14 Re Rose [1952] Ch 499 (CA), (transfer of shares). See also, Mascall v Mascall 
(1984) 49 P & CR 119, (transfer of registered land). 
15 [2002] 1 WLR 2075 (CA). 
16 See M Halliwell, ‘Perfecting Imperfect Gifts and Trusts: Have We Reached the 
End of the Chancellor’s Foot?’ [2003] Conv 192. 
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conceptual clarity that an approach based on unconscionability brings 
over established equitable principles.17 In terms of clarity, the decision of 
Biggs J in Curits v Pullbrook18  has sought to narrow the concept of 
unconscionability in this context by treating the question as essentially 
one of detrimental reliance by the donee which binds the conscience of 
the donor so as to justify the imposition of a constructive trust. In his 
Lordship's view, the donee in Pennington had agreed to become a director 
of the subject company upon an assumption that he had received an 
effective gift of shares in it. This would suggest that the unconscionability 
test in imperfect gift cases is simply another example of the operation of 
proprietary estoppel. 
Where the parties have entered into an arrangement involving the 
purchase of property by one of them, that party may be required to hold 
the property on constructive trust for both of them if it is considered to be 
unconscionable for the party acquiring the property to deny that the other 
party has an equitable interest in the property.19 The three key ingredients 
to raise an equity of this kind are: (1) the existence of an arrangement 
between the parties that beneficial ownership in the property is to be 
shared; (2) the claimant must have relied on the arrangement by doing (or 
omitting to do) something which either confers an advantage on the 
defendant or is detrimental to the ability of the claimant to acquire the 
property on equal terms; and (3) the defendant must have acted 
inconsistently with the arrangement. Significantly, it is the acting 
inconsistently with the arrangement, once the claimant has relied on it, 
that renders the defendant’s conduct unconscionable and which triggers 
the imposition of a constructive trust.20 
The doctrine of secret trusts evolved originally on the basis of not 
allowing a statute to be used as an instrument of fraud so as to deny the 
validity of a secret trust for lack of writing.21 Enforcement of the secret 
                                                     
17 See J Garton, ‘The Role of the Trust Mechanism in the Rule in Re Rose’ 
[2003] Conv 364. 
18 [2011] EWHC 167 (Ch) [43], [46]. See also, Zeital v Kaye [2010] EWCA Civ 
159 (CA) [44]. 
19 See Pallant v Morgan [1953] Ch 43. 
20 See Banner Homes Group plc v Luff Developments Ltd [2000] Ch 371; Yaxley 
v Gotts [2000] Ch 162; Herbert v Doyle [2010] EWCA Civ 1095; Dowding v 
Matchmore Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 1233; Generator Developments LPP v Lidl 
UK GmbH [2018] EWCA Civ 396. 
21  See McCormick v Grogan (1869) LR 4 HL 82, 88-89, 97; Blackwell v 
Blackwell [1929] AC 318 [335]. 
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trust does not, however, depend on the actual fraudulent enrichment of the 
secret trustee – instead, it can be supported on the basis of a general fraud 
committed upon the testator and the secret beneficiaries by reason of the 
failure to observe the intentions of the testator and the destruction of the 
beneficial interests of the secret beneficiaries. In other words, the 
emphasis is on potential not actual wrongdoing. The better view, 
therefore, is that the enforcement of both fully and half-secret trusts rests 
on the principle of enforcing equitable obligations binding the secret 
trustee’s conscience.22  Given that secret trusts are enforced to prevent 
fraud in this wider sense, it is then natural to characterise such trusts as 
constructive trusts falling within the exception to the requirement of 
writing under s.53(2) of the Law of Property Act 1925. The constructive 
trust is imposed on the secret trustee because in good conscience he is 
required to hold the property on trust for the secret beneficiary. Equity 
will not permit the lack of writing to defeat not only the wishes of the 
testator, but also undermine the expectations of the secret beneficiary. In 
Re Cleaver,23 Nourse J characterised secret trusts as constructive trusts. In 
Kasperbauer v Griffith,24 the Court of Appeal accepted that, in secret trust 
cases, equity acts to prevent fraud or unconscionable conduct by imposing 
a constructive trust on the secret trustee. In Gillett v Holt, 25  Roberty 
Walker LJ acknowledged that secret trusts are enforced in order to 
prevent unconscionable conduct. 
Mutual wills arise where two parties (usually husband and wife) make 
identical wills, pursuant to a legally binding agreement, in each other’s 
favour on terms that the survivor will not revoke his will without the 
consent of the other. Normally, revocation will give rise to a claim for 
breach of contract during the joint lives of the parties, but when one party 
has died, if the survivor revokes, the deceased can no longer maintain an 
action for breach of contract. Instead, a constructive trust is imposed in 
equity on the survivor from the moment of the death of the first to die for 
the benefit of those entitled under the deceased’s estate in order to prevent 
an equitable fraud. Significantly, for present purposes, the constructive 
trust arises by operation of law in response to the survivor’s 
unconscionable conduct in not leaving the property as the parties had 
                                                     
22 See Ottaway v Norman [1972] Ch 698, 711; Ledgerwood v Perpetual Trustee 
Co Ltd (1997) 41 NSWLR 532. 
23 [1981] 1 WLR 939, 947. 
24 [2000] WTLR 333. 
25 [2001] Ch 210, 228, referring also to mutual wills where equity has intervened 
to prevent unconscionable conduct. 
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agreed.26 The unconscionability, in these circumstances, arises because 
the other party has relied on the survivor’s promise. 
 
4 UNDUE INFLUENCE 
 
4.1 Modern categorisation 
 
The English courts have traditionally divided the cases on undue 
influence into two distinct categories, namely, those involving (1) actual; 
or (2) presumed undue influence.27  These two categories were further 
refined by the House of Lords in the landmark case of Barclays Bank plc 
v O'Brien.28 In class 1 cases, it is necessary for the claimant to prove that 
the wrongdoer exerted undue influence on the complainant to enter into 
the transaction.  
In class 2 cases (involving presumed undue influence), the 
presumption of undue influence arises when an appropriate relationship 
exists between the parties. Here, the complainant has to show, initially, 
that there was a relationship of trust and confidence between the 
complainant and the wrongdoer of such a nature that it is fair to presume 
that the wrongdoer abused that relationship in procuring the complainant 
to enter into the transaction. In this category, therefore, there is no 
requirement to produce evidence that actual undue influence was exerted 
in relation to the transaction. The relationship can be established in one of 
two ways. First, certain types of relationship, as matter of law, raise the 
presumption of undue influence automatically (class 2a). These include 
solicitor and client, doctor and patient, and parent and child. Significantly, 
however, the relationship of husband and wife does not come within this 
category. Secondly, even if there is no relationship falling within class 2a, 
the specific relationship between the particular parties may be such as to 
give rise to the presumption. Here, the complainant must prove the 
existence of a relationship under which the complainant generally 
“reposed trust and confidence” in the wrongdoer (class 2b). The 
relationship of husband and wife falls within this category.  
An additional element in the presumed undue influence cases (class 2a 
and 2b) has been the need to show that the transaction was manifestly 
                                                     
26 See Ollins v Walters [2009] Ch 212 [37] (Mummery LJ). 
27 See Allcard v Skinner (1887) 36 Ch D 145. 
28 [1993] 4 All ER 417 (HL), adopting the two-fold classification set out in Bank 
of Credit and Commerce International SA v Aboody [1992] 4 All ER 955 (CA). 
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disadvantageous to the complainant. 29  The requirement was first 
introduced by the House of Lords in National Westminster Bank plc v 
Morgan30 and has since been criticised both academically and judicially. 
In CIBC Mortgages plc v Pitt,31 for example, Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
pointed out that this requirement was at odds with the line of cases 
involving abuse of confidence where the onus is on the fiduciary to show 
that the transaction is a fair one. Because of the obvious overlap between 
such relationships and those in which undue influence is presumed, a 
cogent argument exists for abandoning the requirement of manifest 
disadvantage altogether in undue influence cases. Instead, the onus would 
be on the person taking advantage of the claimant to show the 
“righteousness” of the transaction. Unfortunately, the abuse of confidence 
cases were not cited to the House of Lords in Morgan and so the 
interaction between the two sets of principles were not considered.  
Although subsequently the House of Lords in Royal Bank of Scotland 
v Etridge (No 2) 32  recognised that the requirement of manifest 
disadvantage had been the subject of some criticism, it declined to depart 
from its earlier decision in Morgan on this point. It reiterated that the 
burden of proving an allegation of undue influence rested upon the person 
who claims to have been wronged. The evidence required to discharge 
that burden of proof depended on a variety of factors, including the nature 
of the alleged undue influence, the personality of the parties, their 
relationship, the extent to which the transaction cannot readily be 
accounted for by ordinary motives of ordinary persons in that relationship 
and all the circumstances of the case. Normally, proof that the 
complainant placed trust and confidence in the other party in relation to 
the management of the complainant’s financial affairs, coupled with a 
transaction which calls for explanation, would be sufficient to discharge 
the burden of proof. This would then shift the evidential burden onto the 
wrongdoer to produce evidence to counter the inference of undue 
influence. 
 
 
 
                                                     
29 See CIBC Mortgages plc v Pitt [1993] 4 All ER 433 (HL). 
30 [1985] AC 686 (HL). 
31 [1993] 4 All ER 433 (HL). See also, Barclays Bank plc v Coleman [2001] QB 
20 (CA) 30-32 (Nourse LJ). 
32 [2002] AC 773 (HL). 
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4.2 Liability of lending institutions 
 
In Barclays Bank v O’Brien,33 the House of Lords concluded that a 
wife’s right to have a transaction set aside as against her husband on the 
grounds of her husband’s undue influence will be enforceable against a 
bank (or other creditor) if either the husband was acting as the bank’s 
agent, or the bank had actual or constructive notice of the facts giving rise 
to her equity. Undoubtedly, cases where the husband is acting as the 
bank’s agent are rare, so in the majority of claims the question has been 
whether the bank actually knows of the wife’s equity (actual notice) or 
would have discovered it by taking reasonable steps (constructive notice). 
The same test is applied to all other relationships of trust and confidence 
including emotional relationships between cohabitees. However, this 
formulation has since been interpreted in Etridge to mean that a lender 
will automatically be put on inquiry where a wife stands surety for her 
husband’s debts. Indeed, the lender is put on inquiry in every case where 
the relationship between surety and the debtor is non-commercial.34 
If the wife establishes a prima facie inference of undue influence, the 
burden then passes to the lender to show that it had taken reasonable steps 
to satisfy itself that the wife’s consent had been properly obtained. In 
Etridge, the House of Lords concluded that a personal meeting with the 
wife was not the only way a bank could discharge its obligation to bring 
home to the wife the risks she is running. It was not unreasonable for a 
lender to prefer that this task should be undertaken by an independent 
legal adviser. Normally, therefore, it will be reasonable for a bank to rely 
upon the confirmation from a solicitor, acting for the wife, that he has 
advised her appropriately. 
 
5 UNCONSCIONABLE BARGAINS 
 
5.1 The traditional formulation 
 
The classic formulation of this doctrine is to be found in the judgment 
of Kay J in Fry v Lane:35 
 
“The result of the decisions is that where a purchase is made from 
a poor and ignorant man at a considerable undervalue, the vendor 
                                                     
33 [1993] 4 All ER 417 (HL). 
34 Ibid [87]. 
35 (1888) 40 Ch D 312, 322. 
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having no independent advice, a Court of Equity will set aside the 
transaction ... The circumstances of poverty and ignorance of the 
vendor, and the absence of independent, throw upon the 
purchaser, when the transaction is impeached, the onus of proving 
... that the purchase was 'fair, just and reasonable’”. 
 
It has been held that the modern equivalent of “poor and ignorant” is 
“a member of the lower income group ... less highly educated.”36 This 
broadening of the class of claimant eligible for relief has increased 
considerably the potential availability of the doctrine to a wider range of 
transactions where the terms are unconscionable and the victim did not 
receive independent legal advice. In Boustany v Piggot,37 for example, the 
Privy Council was asked to consider whether, on the facts, a lease should 
be set aside on the grounds that it was an unconscionable bargain. In the 
course of his speech, Lord Templeman expressed “general agreement” 
with the following propositions of law: 
It is not sufficient to attract equity’s jurisdiction to prove merely that a 
bargain is hard, unreasonable or foolish. It must be shown to be 
unconscionable in the sense that “one of the parties to it has imposed the 
objectionable terms in a morally reprehensible manner, that is to say, in a 
way which affects his conscience.”38 
The word “unconscionable” relates not only to the terms of the 
bargain, but also to the behaviour of the stronger party, which must be 
characterised by some moral culpability or impropriety.39 
Unequal bargaining power (or objectively unreasonable terms) 
provides no basis for equitable interference in the absence of 
unconscientious or extortionate abuse of power. 
                                                     
36 Cresswell v Potter [1978] 1 WLR 255, 257 (Megarry J). See also, Backhouse v 
Backhouse [1978] 1 All ER 1158 [1165], where a generous interpretation of the 
phrase “poor and ignorant” was applied to a wife who was not “ignorant” but an 
“intelligent woman” and “certainly not wealthy”. The wife, however, was 
“ignorant” in the context of property transactions generally and, in particular, the 
execution of a conveyancing document. 
37  (1995) 69 P & CR 298 (PC). See N Bamforth, ‘Unconscionability as a 
Vitiating Factor’ [1995] LMCLQ 538, who considers the decision in Boustany at 
some length. 
38  Multiservice Bookbinding Ltd v Marden [1979] Ch 84, 110 (Browne-
Wilkinson J). 
39 See Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd v Total Oil (Great Britain) Ltd [1983] 1 WLR 87, 
94-95 (Millett QC) (sitting as a deputy High Court judge). 
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A contract cannot be set aside in equity as an unconscionable bargain 
against a party who is innocent of actual or constructive fraud. Even if the 
terms of the contract are unfair in the sense that they are more favourable 
to one party than the other (i.e., contractual imbalance), equity will not 
provide relief unless the purchaser is guilty of unconscionable conduct.40 
It is necessary for the claimant who seeks relief to establish 
unconscionable conduct, namely, that “unconscientious advantage has 
been taken of his disabling condition or circumstances.”41 
In Fineland Investments Ltd v Pritchard, 42  Mr Alison Foster QC 
reiterated that a court will have little or no sympathy for a complainant 
who seeks to overturn a transaction merely on the grounds that it is a 
foolish bargain which has caused distress and subsequent regret. In the 
words of the deputy judge:43  
 
“ ... equity will not relieve a party from a contract on the ground 
only that there is contractual imbalance not amounting to 
unconscionable dealing; the court of Equity requires ‘undertones 
of constructive fraud’ for the court to consider rescinding a 
contract otherwise properly made.” 
 
In this case, there was no suggestion that the transactions were 
necessarily oppressive in overall terms. On the issue of bargaining 
weakness, whilst it was apparent that the defendant was “not a lady of 
means”, the deputy judge was not prepared to accept that she was under 
any misapprehension as to the documentation she signed. She had asked 
“astute questions” and these were fully investigated and answered before 
she was required to sign. There was also, on the evidence, nothing 
unconscionable about the company’s behaviour towards her. Although 
she was uncertain as to what she wanted to do (which caused her stress) 
and she later had regrets about entering into the transaction, this did not 
amount to oppressive behaviour on the part of the company. A bargain 
which was merely hard or improvident (which, in any event, was not the 
case here) was not in itself enough to trigger the doctrine. Although the 
defendant relied heavily on the Boustany decision, that case was clearly 
                                                     
40 See Hart v O’Connor [1985] AC 1000 (PC) 1017 (Lord Brightman). 
41 Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447 (Mason J) 
(High Court of Australia). 
42 [2011] EWHC 113 (Ch). See also, Minder Music Ltd v Sharples [2015] EWHC 
1454 (IPEC). 
43 Ibid [77] 
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distinguishable. Unlike Fineland, the proposed new lease was obviously 
disadvantageous to Miss Pigott since it would itself be renewable at the 
same (already uncommercial) level of rent for a further 10 year term. In 
addition, it was apparent that the complainant in Boustany had been 
largely duped into entering into the new lease without any proper legal 
advice and unaware of the true market rental value of the premises. In this 
connection, it was significant that the new lease had been executed in the 
absence of Miss Pigott’s cousin who would normally have acted on her 
behalf in relation to her properties. The inference here was that Mrs 
Boustany and her husband had prevailed upon Miss Pigott to execute a 
new lease which they knew her agent would never have agreed. 
 
5.2 Interrelationship between unconscionable bargains and undue 
influence 
 
Significantly, several English cases have alluded to the 
interrelationship between the two doctrines of unconscionable bargains 
and undue influence. In Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Burch,44 a 
case involving a claim of undue influence brought by a junior employee 
against her employer, both Nourse and Millett LJJ suggested that the 
claimant might have brought an alternative claim directly against the bank 
to set aside the charge on the grounds of unconscionability. The 
transaction was manifestly disadvantageous to her and the bank had not 
explained the potential extent of her liability, nor had she received 
independent advice. Nourse LJ, whilst accepting that the case was not 
pleaded on the basis of an unconscionable bargain, nevertheless stated 
that “the unconscionability of the transaction remains of direct materiality 
to the case based on undue influence.” 45  Indeed, in his view, the 
transaction was “so harsh and unconscionable as to make it hardly 
necessary for a court of equity to rely on [Barclays Bank plc v O’Brien]46 
as a basis for avoiding the transaction”.47 Millett LJ also alluded to the 
similarities between the two doctrines and concluded that, if the claimant 
had sought to have the transaction set aside as a harsh and unconscionable 
bargain, she would have to show “not only that the terms of the 
transaction were harsh and oppressive, but that one of the parties to it has 
imposed the objectionable terms in a morally reprehensible manner, that 
                                                     
44 [1997] 1 All ER 144 (CA). 
45 Ibid 151. 
46 [1993] 4 All ER 417 (HL). 
47 [1997] 1 All ER 144 (CA) 146. 
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is to say, in a way which affects his conscience.”48 The recognition in 
Burch that the O’Brien principle is an application of unconscionability has 
prompted several academic writers to suggest that the true basis of the 
decision was not the absence of the claimant’s real consent (i.e. undue 
influence) but the unconscionable conduct on the part of the bank in 
accepting a transaction which was so heavily unbalanced.49 
The Court of Appeal was given a further opportunity to consider the 
interaction between undue influence and unconscionable bargains in 
Portman Building Society v Dusangh.50 What is particularly interesting in 
Ward LJ’s judgment in this case is his open recognition that 
unconscionable conduct was a vitiating factor, similar to undue influence, 
and that the doctrine of notice (as explained in O’Brien) could apply in 
this context, so as to bind the lender in the same way as in a case 
involving undue influence. Significantly, his Lordship relied on a passage 
in Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s speech in O’Brien51 where he stated that a 
wife, who has been induced to stand as surety for her husband’s debts “by 
his undue influence, misrepresentation or some other legal wrong” had an 
equity as against him to set aside the transaction. In his view, 
unconscionable conduct was “some other legal wrong” and, therefore, the 
principle in O’Brien on the issue of notice and third parties was equally 
applicable in cases involving unconscionable bargains. His Lordship also 
cited the following extract from Millett LJ’s judgment in Burch52 where, 
as noted earlier, the similarities between the two jurisdictions to set aside 
unconscionable bargains and transactions obtained by undue influence 
were highlighted: 
 
“In either case it is necessary to show that the conscience of the 
party who seeks to uphold the transaction was affected by notice, 
actual or constructive, of the impropriety by which it was obtained 
by the intermediary . . .” 
 
 
 
                                                     
48 Ibid 153. 
49 See for example, M Chen-Wishart, ‘The O’Brien Principle and Substantive 
Unfairness’ [1977] CLJ 60, 63. 
50 [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 221. 
51 [1994] 4 All ER 417 (HL) 428. 
52 [1997] 1 All ER 144 (CA) 153. 
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5.3 Does the doctrine apply to gifts? 
 
It is not clear whether the doctrine of unconscionable bargains applies 
to gifts. In Langton v Langton,53 Mr AWH Charles QC (sitting as a deputy 
High Court judge) set aside a deed of gift procured by actual/presumed 
undue influence. It was not, therefore, strictly necessary for him to 
consider a further ground for setting aside the gift, namely, that it 
constituted an unconscionable bargain. The deputy judge, however, 
opined that, if the doctrine applied to gifts, it would mean that, in the case 
of all gifts by poor and ignorant persons without independent legal advice, 
the onus of proving that the gift was fair, just and reasonable would be 
placed on the recipient. That, in his view, would be a surprising result. 
Moreover, the formulation of the doctrine as expressed by Kay in in Fry v 
Lane was limited to purchases of property and the description “fair, just 
and reasonable” in that case was a phrase that applied to bargains and not 
gifts. In his judgment, the rationale behind the development of the 
doctrine of unconscionable bargains was to protect people who were in 
need of money from being taken advantage of by persons prepared to 
provide it for an exorbitant consideration. It did not, therefore, apply to 
gifts which was a different type of disposition and one where the donor 
was, by definition, not seeking a return. As the deputy judge conceded, 
however, the doctrine has been applied to an unconscionable transaction 
which, although described and treated as a bargain, was in effect a gift.54. 
Moreover, the view taken in Langton does not accord with 
Commonwealth authority. In Wilton v Farnworth, 55  the claimant was 
deaf, poorly educated and dull witted. His stepson persuaded him to sign 
various documents allowing the former to apply for letters of 
administration to the claimant’s wife’s estate and releasing his interest 
therein to him. The High Court of Australia had no difficulty in setting 
aside the transaction as an unconscionable dealing. Rich J stated:56 
 
“ ... the jurisdiction of courts of equity is based upon 
unconscientious dealing. It has always been considered 
unconscientious to retain the advantage of a voluntary disposition 
                                                     
53 [1995] 2 FLR 890. 
54 See Cresswell v Potter [1978] 1 WLR 244, 259 (Megarry J): “what was done 
by the release was, in substance, that a gift was made by a wife who was being 
divorced to the husband who was divorcing her”.  
55 (1948) 76 CLR 646 (High Court of Australia).  
56 Ibid 655. 
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of a large amount of property improvidently made by an alleged 
donor who did not understand the nature of the transaction and 
lacked information of material facts such as the nature and extent 
of the property particularly if made in favour of a done possessing 
greater information who nevertheless withheld the facts.” 
 
Similarly, Latham CJ stated:57  
 
“ ... if a donee is the moving spirit in the transaction of a gift, and 
the donor is of weak will or of poor mentality, a court of equity 
will set aside the gift unless it is shown that the donor understood 
the substance of what he was doing.” 
 
The better view, therefore, is that both gifts and bargains are subject to 
the doctrine of unconscionability.58 More recently, in Evans v Lloyd,59 HH 
Judge Keyser QC (sitting as a judge of the High Court), after considering 
Langton, concluded that to exclude gifts from the scope of the doctrine 
would make its application turn on form over substance which was to be 
avoided in an equitable jurisdiction.60 He also noted that the doctrine had 
been applied to gifts without inconvenience in the Australian and 
Republic of Ireland61 jurisdictions. 
 
5.4 The three governing elements  
 
The three key elements of the doctrine of unconscionable bargains 
may, therefore, be summarised as follows: 
                                                     
57 Wilton (n 55) 648. See also, Louth v Diprose (1993) 67 ALJR 95, 97 (High 
Court of Australia), where Brennan J stated: “gifts obtained by unconscionable 
conduct and gifts obtained by undue influence are set aside by equity on 
substantially the same basis.” 
58 See further, D Capper, ‘Unconscionable Bargains and Unconscionable Gifts’ 
[1996] Conv 308. In Capper’s view, gifts do not provide any distinction between 
undue influence and unconscionability. Indeed, it supports his premise that 
contractual imbalance provides merely an evidential function under both 
doctrines. In this connection, it has been held that the requirement of manifest 
disadvantage is not necessary for gifts: Geffen v Goodman Estate [1991] 2 SCR 
353, 378 (Wilson J). This must be right since otherwise it would be difficult to 
uphold gifts (which, by their very nature, are one-sided) under either doctrine. 
59 [2013] EWHC 1725 (Ch). 
60 Ibid [52]. 
61 See Prendergast v Joyce [2009] IEHC 199. 
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 Contractual imbalance (i.e. the bargain itself must be 
oppressive) 
 Relational inequality (i.e. the complainant was in a position of 
bargaining weakness) 
 Unconscionable conduct (i.e. the other party must have 
knowingly taken advantage of the complainant) 
 
So far as contractual imbalance is concerned, the cases show that the 
complainant must have entered into a transaction which was substantively 
unfair, in that he received nothing or very little in return. In other words, 
the terms of the transaction are so unfair that they shock the conscience of 
the court. In Burch, for example, the crucial factor in the Court of 
Appeal’s decision was the extreme substantive unfairness of the 
transaction which gave rise to “grave suspicion” and cried “aloud for an 
explanation”.62 The second element (relational inequality) requires that 
the complainant be in some position of weakness (or special 
disadvantage) in relation to the other party. As we have seen, the phrase 
“ignorant and poor” in this context has been defined in the modern cases 
to mean someone who is not well educated and in a lower income group. 
In Alec Lobb Ltd v Total Oil (Great Britain) Ltd,63  Peter Millett QC 
(sitting as a deputy High Court judge) stated 64  that the doctrine was 
capable of applying “if one party has been at a serious disadvantage to the 
other, whether through poverty, or ignorance, or lack of advice, or 
otherwise, so that circumstances existed of which unfair advantage could 
be taken”. It is apparent, for example, that inability to speak English, if 
taken advantage of, may come within the doctrine.65 The third element of 
the doctrine (unconscionable conduct) is also crucial to the granting of 
relief. In Hart v O’Connor, 66  Lord Brightman identified two distinct 
meanings of unfairness in the context of a contractual transaction. First, a 
contract may be unfair because of the unfair manner in which it is brought 
into existence. A contract induced by undue influence is unfair in this 
sense (i.e. procedural unfairness). Alternatively, a contract may be 
described as unfair by reason of the fact that the terms of the contract are 
more favourable to one party than to the other (i.e. contractual imbalance). 
According to His Lordship, both procedural unfairness and contractual 
                                                     
62 Ibid 152 (Millett LJ). 
63 [1983] 1 WLR 87. 
64 Ibid 94-95. 
65 See, Barclays Bank plc v Schwartz (1995) The Times, 2 August. 
66 [1985] AC 1000 (PC). 
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imbalance were necessary to relieve a party from a transaction. 67 
However, he also intimated that contractual imbalance may be so extreme 
as to raise a presumption of procedural unfairness (for example, undue 
influence or some other form of victimisation). This is also acknowledged 
by Millett LJ in Burch, where he suggested that, both in unconscionable 
bargain and undue influence cases, the court could “infer the presence of 
impropriety from the terms of the transaction itself”.68 
 
6 THE COMMONWEALTH EXPERIENCE 
 
In the Commonwealth jurisdictions, the courts have tended to accept a 
more general doctrine of unconscionability. It will be convenient to 
examine briefly the position in Canada, Australia and New Zealand. 
Unlike the English courts, these jurisdictions have been far more open to 
the notion that a transaction can be unconscionable because the terms are 
considerably more advantageous to the stronger party who passively 
receives those advantages in the knowledge that the other (weaker) party 
is vulnerable.69 As we have seen, under English law, unconscionability 
normally requires that the stronger party has imposed the objectionable 
terms in a morally reprehensible manner,70 although the courts have also 
acknowledged that a contract may be so unfair (or one-sided) as to raise a 
presumption of procedural unfairness. 
 
6.1 Canada 
 
An early leading authority is Morrison v Coast Finance Ltd,71 which, 
interestingly, was cited by Lord Denning MR in Bundy72 as illustrative of 
his proposition that the doctrine of unconscionable transactions extends to 
“all cases where an unfair advantage has been gained by an 
                                                     
67 Ibid 1018. 
68 [1997] 1 All ER 144 (CA) 153. See also, Portman Building Society v Dusangh 
[2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 221 (CA) 235, where Ward LJ refers to “an evidential 
assumption of wrongdoing” if the transaction itself cries out for an explanation. 
69 See, D Capper, ‘The Unconscionable Bargain in the Common Law World’ 
(2010) 126 LQR 403, 416.  
70 See for example, Multiservice Bookbinding Ltd v Marden [1979] Ch 84, 110 
(Browne-Wilkinson). 
71(1965) 55 DLR (2d) 710. For an overview, see Halsbury’s Laws of Canada, 
Restitution, 2017 Reissue, (LexisNexis) 976-981. 
72 [1974] 3 All ER 757 (CA) 764. 
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unconscientious use of power by a stronger party against a weaker”. In 
Morrison, an elderly widow with slender means was persuaded by two 
men to mortgage her home and lend the proceeds to them so that they 
could repay a loan to the first defendant lender and buy two cars from the 
second defendant. The British Columbia Court of Appeal held that the 
transaction was unconscionable and granted relief. The case is significant 
in that it sets out the material ingredients for a successful claim to set 
aside a contract on the ground of unconscionability. The two vital 
elements were: (1) proof of inequality in the positions of the parties 
arising out of ignorance, need or distress of the weaker, leaving him (or 
her) in the power of the stronger party; and (2) proof of substantial 
unfairness of the bargain thus obtained by the stronger party. Once these 
elements were satisfied, a presumption of fraud arose which could only be 
rebutted by showing that the bargain was fair, just and reasonable with no 
advantage taken. In the course of his judgment, Davey JA stated:73 
 
“The equitable principles relating to undue influence and relief 
against unconscionable bargains are closely related, but the 
doctrines are separate and  distinct. The finding here against undue 
influence does not conclude the question whether the appellant is 
entitled to relief against an unconscionable transaction.” 
 
In his Honour's view, 74  a plea of undue influence attacked “the 
sufficiency of consent” whilst the doctrine of unconscionable bargains 
invoked “relief against an unfair advantage gained by an unconscientious 
use of power by a stronger party against a weaker”.  
Despite this initial reluctance to assimilate the two doctrines under 
one umbrella of unconscionability, it is significant that, since the English 
decision in Bundy, the Canadian courts have adopted the broader 
formulation of “inequality of bargaining power” enunciated by Lord 
Denning MR in that case as part of their law. In McKenzie v Bank of 
Montreal,75 for example, the Ontario High Court, applying Bundy, held 
that a bank, who had knowledge that the claimant had been acting under 
the undue influence of her partner, owed a duty of care to her to ensure 
that she appreciated and intended the consequences of the transaction. 
                                                     
73 Ibid 713. 
74 Ibid. 
75 (1975) 55 DLR (3d) 641. See also, Buchanan v Canadian Imperial Bank of 
Commerce (1979) 100 DLR (3d) 624 (British Columbia Supreme Court); Bertolo 
v Bank of Montreal (1986) 33 DLR (4d) 610 (Ontario Court of Appeal). 
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This meant providing the claimant with the necessary information and 
advice, or to see that she had obtained it. Since the bank had failed in that 
duty, the mortgage was set aside.  
Indeed, some of the Canadian cases have gone further. Most notably, 
in Harry v Kreutziger,76 another decision of the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal, Lambert JA propounded a broader test of unconscionability based 
on “community standards of commercial morality”. He stated:77  
 
“In my opinion, questions as to whether use of power was 
unconscionable, an advantage unfair or very unfair, a 
consideration was grossly inadequate, or bargaining power was 
grievously impaired, to select words from both statements of 
principle, the Morrison case and the Bundy case, are really aspects 
of one single question. That single question is whether the 
transaction, seen as a whole, is sufficiently divergent from 
community standards of commercial morality that it should be 
rescinded. To my mind, the framing of the question in that way 
prevents the real issue from being obscured by an isolated 
consideration of a number of questions ...” 
 
In this case, the appellant, an elderly, inarticulate Indian man with 
limited education, who was also partially deaf, agreed to sell his fishing 
boat for $4,500. In fact, the boat was worth $16,000, largely because of a 
fishing licence attached to it. The buyer, a man of great business 
experience and with full knowledge of the true value of the boat, induced 
the sale by assuring the appellant that he could easily obtain another 
licence. Not surprisingly, the sale was set aside as an unconscionable 
bargain. The circumstances of the transaction revealed a “marked 
departure” from community standards of commercial morality. 
Significantly, this test has been applied in several subsequent Canadian 
authorities.78 
                                                     
76 (1978) 95 DLR (3d) 231. 
77 Ibid 241. 
78 See for example, A&K Lick-a-Chick Franchises Ltd v Cordiv Enterprises Ltd 
(1981) 119 DLR (3d) 44 (Nova Scotia Supreme Court). For a full review of the 
cases, see SR Enman, ‘Doctrines of Unconscionability in Canadian, English and 
Commonwealth Contract Law’ (1987) 16 Anglo-American Law Review 191. 
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A more traditional formulation of the doctrine, however, was applied 
in Cain v Clarica Life Insurance Co, 79  where Cote J outlined the 
following key elements as necessary to found relief: 
 
“1. A grossly unfair and improvident transaction; and 
2. The victim's lack of independent legal or other suitable advice; 
and 
3. An overwhelming imbalance in bargaining power caused by the 
victim's ignorance  of business, illiteracy, ignorance of the 
language of the bargain, blindness, deafness, senility, or similar 
disability; and 
4. The other party's knowingly taking advantage of this.” 
 
6.2 Australia 
 
There are several landmark cases in the Australian jurisdiction which 
call for comment. In Blomley v Ryan,80 an uneducated farmer, 78 years 
old, who was mentally and physically weak, suffering from the effects of 
intoxication, conveyed his farm to the purchaser who knew of his 
disabilities and the inadequacy of the price. The transaction was held to be 
unconscionable and the contract was set aside. McTiernan J stated81 that 
“the essence of the fraud” was that “advantage was taken of weakness, 
ignorance and other disabilities ... and the contract was derived from such 
behaviour and it is an unfair bargain.” In his view, the principle extended 
to “all cases in which the parties to a contract have not met upon equal 
terms.” 82  Fullagar J identified some of the circumstances adversely 
affecting a party which may induce the court to set aside the transaction. 
Among these, he listed “poverty or need of any kind, sickness, age, sex, 
infirmity of the body or mind, drunkenness, illiteracy or lack of education, 
lack of assistance or explanation where assistance or explanation is 
necessary”.83 In his view, the common characteristic was that they placed 
one party at a serious disadvantage to the other.  
                                                     
79  (2005) 263 DLR (4th) 368 (Alberta Court of Appeal) [31]-[32]. These 
elements were applied in Lydian Properties Inc v Chambers (2009) 457 AR 211 
(Alberta Court of Appeal). 
80 (1956) 99 CLR 362 (High Court of Australia). 
81 Ibid [386]. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Bromley (n 80) Ibid 405. 
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Another landmark decision is Commonwealth Bank of Australia v 
Amadio,84  where Mason J concluded that the jurisdiction to set aside 
transactions as unconscionable arose “whenever one party by reason of 
some condition or circumstance is placed at a special disadvantage vis a 
vis another and unfair or unconscientious advantage is then taken of the 
opportunity thereby created.” 85  Thus, as under English law, three 
requirements were necessary to raise the equity: (1) an improvident 
arrangement; (2) inequality of bargaining power; and (3) an 
unconscientious taking of advantage of the party under a special 
disability. Interestingly, Mason J also considered86 that, whilst there was 
“some resemblance” between unconscionable conduct and undue 
influence, an important distinction was that: 
 
“In the latter, the will of the innocent party is not independent and 
voluntary because it is overborne. In the former, the will of the 
innocent party, even if independent and voluntary, is the result of 
the disadvantageous position in which he is placed and of the 
other party unconscientiously taking advantage of that position.”  
 
He acknowledged, however, that the two doctrines were not mutually 
exclusive in the sense that only one of them could be available in a 
particular situation to the exclusion of the other. In his view:87  
 
“Relief on the ground of unconscionable conduct will be granted 
when unconscientious advantage is taken of an innocent party 
whose will is overborne so that it is not independent and 
voluntary, just as it will be granted when such advantage is taken 
of an innocent party who, though not deprived of an independent 
and voluntary will, is unable to make a worthwhile judgment as to 
what is in his best interest.” 
 
A similar conclusion was reached by Deane J, who considered that the 
equitable principles relating to unconscionable dealing and undue 
influence were “closely related” but, nonetheless, “distinct”.88 In his view, 
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85 Ibid 462. 
86 Amadio (n 84) 461. 
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110-5885: “Unlike undue influence, which like common law duress, looks to the 
 
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
 
 
137 
undue influence looks to the quality of the consent of the weaker party 
whereas unconscionable dealing looks to the conduct of the stronger party 
“in attempting to enforce, or retain the benefit of, a dealing with a person 
under a special disability in circumstances where it is not consistent with 
equity or good conscience that he should do so”.89  
It is submitted, however, that these distinctions are somewhat illusory. 
The doctrine of undue influence does, in fact, involve the wrongdoer in 
taking unconscientious advantage of an innocent party who is in a 
disadvantageous position. As Phang has stated,90 “under class 1 and class 
2b undue influence, it may be stated that the innocent party is often 
manipulated into a situation of disadvantage”. And, as one Australian 
commentator has observed:91  
 
“The parallels between presumed unconscionable conduct 
(contracting in the knowledge that the other party labours under a 
special disadvantage) and presumed undue influence (contracting 
in the knowledge that the other party reposes trust and confidence 
in one in the relevant sense) are significant. Both doctrines require 
sufficient awareness or perception on the part of the stronger party 
and, it is suggested, the tests for sufficient awareness should be the 
same in both cases. Both doctrines impose a similar duty: to 
ensure that the weaker party has formed an independent and 
informed judgment; this duty may be discharged by allowing the 
weaker party an opportunity to seek independent legal advice ... 
And, most importantly, both doctrines are designed to mitigate the 
risk of abuse by the stronger party of his position of special 
advantage. Abuse of a perceived position of special advantage is 
the thread that links these two equitable doctrines.” 
                                                                                                                        
quality of the consent or assent of the weaker party, unconscionable dealing looks 
to the conduct of the stronger party in attempting to force, or retain the benefit of, 
a dealing with a person under a special disability or disadvantage in 
circumstances where it is not consistent with equity or good conscience that he or 
she should do so. On this basis, the jurisdiction in relation to unconscionable 
conduct is distinct from the jurisdiction in relation to undue influence, where the 
essential focus is on the position of the plaintiff rather than the conduct of the 
defendant.” 
89 Amido (n 84) [474]. 
90 See A Phang, ‘Undue Influence: Methodology, Sources and Linkages’ [1995] 
JBL 552, 568. 
91  See IJ Hardingham, ‘The High Court of Australia and Unconscionable 
Dealing’ (1984) 4 OJLS 275, 286. 
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This, of course, reflects the view taken by Lord Denning MR in 
Bundy 92  and his formulation of a general principle linking undue 
influence, unconscionable transactions (and other vitiating factors) under 
the “single thread” of inequality of bargaining power. In Amadio, the facts 
did not warrant any finding that the bank was in a confidential 
relationship with the parents since the latter relied on their son, not the 
bank, to advise them on the nature of the loan transaction. Had, however, 
the bank “crossed the line” into the area of confidentiality then, clearly, 
issues relating to a presumed undue influence would have arisen for 
consideration. 
In another important decision, the High Court of Australia sought to 
apply the concept of unconscionability to a situation where a surety wife 
did not understand the purpose and effect of the guarantee she signed and 
there was a failure by the bank to explain properly the transaction to her. 
In National Australia Bank Ltd v Garcia,93 the majority of the High Court, 
applying the earlier case of Yerkey v Jones,94 held that the lender had 
acted unconscionably in enforcing the guarantee against the wife because: 
(1) she did not understand the purpose and effect of the transaction; (2) 
she was a volunteer because she did not obtain any benefit from the 
transaction; (3) the lender was taken to have understood that, as a wife, 
she may have reposed trust and confidence in her husband in business 
matters and, therefore, to have understood that the husband may not have 
fully and accurately explained the effect of the transaction to her; and (4) 
the lender took no steps to explain the purport and effect of the transaction 
to her or to ascertain whether it had been explained to her by a competent, 
independent and disinterested stranger. The significance of this case is 
that the High Court rejected the English O’Brien approach (grounded in 
the notion of notice) in favour of a (revived) wife’s “special equity” 
doctrine, which allowed her to set aside a guarantee on the grounds that 
she did not understand it and that its nature and effect had not been 
explained to her. This equity, however, was based, not on the status and 
abilities of married women, but rather (as in Etridge) the potential for 
abuse of trust within the marriage relationship. The element of notice, 
therefore, was only relevant in determining whether or not the lender 
knew, at the time of the guarantee, that the surety was married to the 
borrower. In effect, the decision in Garcia imposed a strict (primary) 
liability on lenders to disclose full and accurate information to wives who 
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act as sureties for their husband’s debts. The High Court also intimated 
that equity’s special protection could extend to other relationships (for 
example, heterosexual or homosexual cohabitees).95 
Finally, reference should be made to Louth v Diprose,96 where the 
majority of the High Court of Australia held that the respondent was 
entitled to recover a substantial gift of money which he had made to a 
woman (the appellant) with whom he had had a romantic relationship for 
several years. In fact, the respondent, had been infatuated with the 
appellant and it was apparent that the latter had exploited his emotional 
dependence on her. When she needed a place to live, he bought a house 
for her and had it conveyed into her sole name. The judgment of Brennan 
J is of particular interest because he sought to assimilate the court’s 
jurisdiction to set aside gifts procured by unconscionable conduct with the 
“similar” jurisdiction to set aside gifts procured by undue influence. In his 
view,97 both depended upon the effect of influence (presumed or actual) 
improperly brought to bear by one party to a relationship on the mind of 
the other whereby the other disposes of his property. This similarity 
“gives to cases arising in the exercise of one jurisdiction an analogous 
character in considering cases involving the same points in the other 
jurisdiction.” The effect of this judgment is substantially to merge the 
concept of unconscionability with that of undue influence. 
 
6.3 New Zealand 
 
In Archer v Cutler,98 a contract for the sale of 10 acres of land was 
executed by the parties at the defendant’s residence. Medical evidence 
later showed that the defendant was suffering from senile dementia. 
Although living alone, she was incapable of managing her own affairs and 
unable to keep proper appraisals of facts and conscious judgments on 
important matters. The claimant did not know of the defendant’s impaired 
mental condition, nor of its effect on her ability to understand the bargain 
                                                     
95 See further, M Bryan, ‘Setting Aside Guarantees: Reviving and Old Equity’ 
[1999] LMCLQ 327; M Brown, ‘Suretyship and Marriage: Notice v 
Unconscionability’ (2000) RLR 152; E Stone, ‘Infants, Lunatics and Married 
Women: Equitable Protection in Garcia v National Australia Bank’ (1999) 62 
MLR 604; A Finlay, ‘Australian Wives are Special: Yerkey v Jones Lives On’ 
[1999] JBL 361. 
96 (1993) 67 ALJR 95. 
97 Ibid 98. 
98 [1980] 1 NZLR 386 (Supreme Court of Auckland). 
UNDUE INFLUENCE: TOWARDS A UNIFYING CONCEPT OF 
UNCONSCIONABLITY? 
 
140 
she had entered into. The claimant was also unaware that the agreed price 
represented a substantial undervalue for the land. The Supreme Court of 
Auckland held, nevertheless, that the defence of unconscionable bargain 
was established. The decision clearly went further than the English and 
Australian authorities, which require that the stronger party actually take 
advantage of his position. Not surprisingly, therefore, in Hart v 
O’Connor,99 the Privy Council (on appeal from the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal) held, overruling the Archer case, that a contract could not be set 
aside as an unconscionable bargain where the purchaser had acted 
completely innocently and was not guilty of any unconscionable conduct. 
Subsequent New Zealand cases have adopted this approach, albeit with 
some reluctance. 
In Nichols v Jessup (No 2), 100  the claimant sought specific 
performance of an agreement between himself and the defendant to grant 
mutual rights of way over their respective properties so as to improve the 
road access to the claimant’s rear section. The High Court held, ostensibly 
applying the Hart v O’Connor ruling, that because the claimant was aware 
of the defendant’s weaknesses in regard to financial and property matters, 
which was manifestly one-sided, the agreement could properly be set 
aside as unconscionable. Significantly, as the High Court itself conceded, 
there was no evidence in this case to suggest that the claimant had 
consciously intended to take advantage of the defendant’s ignorance when 
she was persuaded to agree to his proposal regarding the rights of way. In 
the absence of any moral fraud, therefore, it has been suggested by one 
commentator101 that the transaction should have been upheld. 
In Contractors Bonding Ltd v Snee,102 the Wellington Court of Appeal 
also applied Hart v O’Connor, holding that equity will only intervene to 
deprive parties of their contractual rights where they have unconscionably 
obtained benefits or have accepted benefits in unconscionable 
circumstances (i.e. where they would be acting unconscientiously in 
receiving or retaining their bargain). In this case, the complainant was 
under a special disability at the time of contracting due to her mental 
capacity resulting in a defective understanding of her affairs and of the 
transaction. That, however, in itself, was not enough to establish that the 
company was guilty of fraud. It had no knowledge of, and could not be 
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101 See further, N Bamforth, ‘Unconscionability as a Vitiating Factor’ [1995] 
LMCLQ 538. 
102 [1992] 2 NZLR 157 (Wellington Court of Appeal). 
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
 
 
141 
expected to have any awareness of, her incapacity and, moreover, had no 
reason to believe that she was under the influence of her son. In addition, 
the guarantee and mortgage over her house were standard commercial 
transactions with no unusual features which the company was required to 
disclose to the complainant. The transaction, therefore, could not be 
characterised as improvident (amounting to contractual imbalance) nor 
was there any evidence of unfairness or overreaching on the part of the 
company. The result, therefore, was that the company could rely on its 
mortgage. 
Interestingly, in Walmsley v Christchurch City Council, 103  Hardie 
Boys J opined that the concepts of undue influence and unconscionability 
were “different concepts, although both are founded on fraud, in the sense 
of an unconscionable use of power”. In Bowkett v Action Finance 
Ltd,104Tipping J set out the following circumstances which, in his view, 
would normally be present when a court finds an unconscionable bargain: 
(1) the weaker party is under a considerable disability; (2) the stronger 
party knows or ought to know of that disability; (3) the stronger party has 
victimised the weaker in the sense of taking advantage of the weaker 
party’s disability, either by active extortion of the bargain, or passive 
acceptance of it in circumstances where it is contrary to conscience that 
the bargain should be accepted; (4) there is a marked inadequacy of 
consideration and the stronger party either knows or ought to know that to 
be so: and (5) there is some procedural impropriety either demonstrated or 
presumed from the circumstances. In Tipping J’s view,105 not all elements 
need necessarily be shown, but elements 1-3 were crucial, as there could 
not be an unconscionable bargain without a disability in the weaker party 
and knowledge and taking advantage thereof by the stronger party. He 
also intimated that absence of independent advice was a frequent feature 
of unconscionable bargain cases. What was important, however, was the 
“cumulative weight of all relevant points” in determining “the ultimate 
question” as to whether the bargain could properly be characterised as 
unconscionable so that equity should intervene. 
Tipping J had a further opportunity to formulate the relevant 
principles in Gustav & Co Ltd v Macfield Ltd,106 where he stated:107 
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“Equity will intervene when one party in entering into a 
transaction, unconscientiously takes advantage of the other. That 
will be so when the stronger party knows or ought to be aware, 
that the weaker party is unable adequately to look after his own 
interests and is acting to his detriment. Equity will not allow the 
stronger  party to procure or accept a transaction in these 
circumstances. The remedy is conscience-based and, in qualifying 
cases, the Court intervenes and says that the stronger party may 
not take advantage of the rights acquired under the transaction 
because it would be contrary to good conscience to do so.” 
 
As Capper 108  has observed, “the approach to the unconscionable 
bargain in New Zealand is practically indistinguishable from the approach 
in Australia.” 
 
7 AN UNDERLYING CONCEPT OF 
UNCONSCIONABILITY? 
 
Undoubtedly, there is a close relationship between the principles 
relating to undue influence and unconscionable bargains. Should the two 
be fused within one all-embracing doctrine? Academic commentators 
differ on whether this would be a useful process. Capper, in an influential 
article,109 has argued that the two doctrines share three common features: 
(1) inequality in the bargaining positions of the parties (i.e., relational 
inequality): (2) transactional imbalance; and (3) unconscionable conduct 
on the part of the defendant. He acknowledges, however, that these 
features are mere “distillations from the cases, rather than judicially 
determined principles.110 
So far as the first element is concerned, this is present in presumed 
undue influence cases, in so far as the complainant must prove the 
existence of a relationship under which he (or she) generally reposed trust 
and confidence in the wrongdoer. Relational inequality is always present 
(by definition) in actual undue influence cases. And, as we have seen, the 
requirement is also to be found in unconscionability cases in that the 
                                                     
108 See D Capper, ‘The Unconscionable Bargain in the Common Law World’ 
(2010) 126 LQR 403. 
109 See D Capper, ‘Undue Influence and Unconscionability: A Rationalisation’ 
(1998) 114 LQR 479. 
110 See D Capper, ‘The Unconscionable Bargain in the Common Law World’ 
(2010) 126 LQR 403, 417. 
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complainant must be shown to be suffering from some special 
disadvantage to warrant equity's intervention. Capper concludes that “the 
kind of relational inequality sufficient to support a case of 
unconscionability is clearly very broad and there cannot be any difficulty 
in fitting cases of undue influence within it.”111 
Turning to transactional imbalance, Capper concedes that this 
requirement does not feature in the actual undue influence category, 
which requires mere proof of actual coercion over the weaker party. His 
argument, however, is that transactional imbalance (i.e. the bargain itself 
must be oppressive) is not an essential requirement of any undue 
influence or unconscionability case (albeit invariably present), but simply 
“powerful evidence in support of relational inequality and unconscionable 
conduct, which are the true invalidating grounds.”112 On this point, he 
(like other commentators) doubts whether manifest disadvantage should 
be an essential feature of the presumed undue influence category. The 
better view, as we have seen, is that manifest disadvantage should take the 
form of a purely evidential consideration when the wrongdoer is seeking 
to rebut the presumption of undue influence. In other words, there is no 
reason why a complainant should not rely on the doctrine even though the 
transaction itself is objectively reasonable. Take, for example, a solicitor 
who buys his client's house at a fair price. The requisite relationship of 
confidence would exist between the parties (i.e. relational inequality) and 
there seems no reason why the presumption of undue influence should not 
arise requiring the solicitor to show that the client had formed an 
independent and informed judgment. The mere fact that the price was fair 
would not be enough to rebut the presumption because “there might be all 
sorts of reasons, apart from the price, why the client did not want to sell 
his house.”113 Transactional imbalance, according to Capper, is also not an 
essential precondition to a finding of unconscionability. Although many 
of the cases do involve sales at an undervalue and other forms of 
contractual imbalance, this is not always the case.114 He concludes that “if 
                                                     
111 Ibid 486.  
112 Ibid. 
113National Westminster Bank plc v Morgan [1983] 3 All ER 85 (CA) (Dunn LJ). 
114 He cites, for example, the Australian case of Blomley v Ryan (1956) 99 CLR 
362, where the High Court of Australia held that the decisive factors of 
unconscionability were the seller's mental weakness and the purchaser's 
unconscionable conduct. In that case, the property was sold for $25,000, its true 
value being not significantly more ($33,000). Capper also cites Deane J, in 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447, 475, who 
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manifest disadvantage assumes the evidential role recommended for it in 
respect of presumed undue influence, then assimilation with actual undue 
influence and unconscionability becomes relatively easy.”115 
Finally, so far as unconscionable conduct is concerned, this, according 
to Capper, is a requirement of both doctrines. It is clearly evident in actual 
undue influence cases and is an essential feature of unconscionability 
cases. In his view, “actual undue influence (without pressure) is only 
different from presumed undue influence in so far as what is presumed in 
the latter is affirmatively proved in the former.”116  On this reasoning, 
therefore, both actual and presumed undue influence should be subsumed 
under a general doctrine of unconscionability. Although, in the presumed 
undue influence category, coercion and abuse by the defendant is less 
easy to discern, nevertheless, many of the cases on unconscionable 
dealing, as we have seen, also concern little more than passive acceptance 
of benefits received under unconscionable circumstances.117  
Not all commentators, however, have agreed with this attempt at 
rationalisation. Birks and Chin,118 for example, have argued that undue 
influence and unconscionability are essentially separate and distinct 
concepts and favour preserving the distinction between the two. They 
regard undue influence as being “plaintiff-sided” and concerned with the 
weakness of the claimant's consent owing to an excessive dependence 
upon the defendant, and unconscionability as being “defendant-sided” and 
concerned with the defendant's exploitation of the claimant’s 
vulnerability. In support of this contention, they draw attention to two 
features of the presumed undue influence cases. First, many of the 
presumed undue influence cases do not involve any conscious 
wrongdoing on the part of the defendant  on the contrary, the evidence 
shows merely a passive receipt of benefits arising from the transaction. 
                                                                                                                        
opined that, whilst most unconscionability cases involved inadequacy of 
consideration, this was not essential. 
115 D Capper, ‘Undue Influence and Unconscionability: A Rationalisation’ (1998) 
114 LQR 479, 500. 
116 Ibid 493. 
117  See for example, Hart v O'Connor [1985] AC 1000 (PC) 1024 (Lord 
Brightman): “... it is victimisation, which can consist either of the active extortion 
of a benefit or the passive acceptance of a benefit in unconscionable 
circumstances.” 
118 See P Birks and NY Chin, ‘On the Nature of Undue Influence’ in J Beatson 
and D Friedmann (eds), Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law (Clarendon Press 
1995); J Devenney and A Chandler, ‘Unconscionability and the Taxonomy of 
Undue Influence’ [2007] JBL 541. 
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Secondly, where the presumption of undue influence is raised, it is open 
to the defendant to rebut the presumption by showing that the complainant 
had acted freely and with an independent will. This requirement, 
therefore, is directed at the issue of consent and is not concerned with any 
wrongdoing on the part of the defendant. Some writers, however, have 
questioned this analysis. Thus, Bigwood 119  has argued that undue 
influence is defendant/conduct-based in both its concerns and orientation. 
In his view, both undue influence and unconscionable dealings concern a 
form of exploitation, although the source of the claimant's vulnerability is 
different in each case. Despite this difference between the two concepts, 
he concludes that “there is no logical reason” why the jurisdiction of 
unconscionable dealings could not include undue influence. 
What is also overlooked, it is submitted, in Birks and Chin's analysis, 
is that the passive acceptance of benefits, as we have seen from the 
Commonwealth experience, may itself be unconscionable in the 
circumstances of a particular case. 120  It does not necessarily have to 
involve wicked exploitation. As Capper has pointed out, many of the 
unconscionability cases have this common feature and, therefore, there 
seems little reason why undue influence and unconscionability should not 
be assimilated. Any such new (combined) doctrine would not be either 
specifically “plaintiff-sided” or specifically “defendant-sided” (as Birks 
and Chin) maintain because “the stronger the plaintiff-sided the weaker 
the defendant-sided factor needs to be and vice versa, although a degree 
of unconscionable conduct would be present in all cases since the passive 
receipt of benefits flowing under a seriously unbalanced transaction where 
the plaintiff was clearly in an unequal relationship with the defendant 
would count as unconscionable conduct.”121 
This unifying doctrine of unconscionability could also be extended to 
embrace the liability of a third party lender in circumstances where it has 
actual or constructive notice that the loan transaction is tainted with undue 
influence, misrepresentation or some other equitable wrong. Thus, in 
                                                     
119 See R Bigwood, ‘Undue Influence: Impaired Consent or Wicked Exploitation’ 
(1996) 16 OJLS 503. 
120 See J Devenney and A Chandler, ‘Unconscionability and the Taxonomy of 
Undue Influence’ [2007] JBL 541. 
121 D Capper, ‘Undue Influence and Unconscionability: A Rationalisation’ (1998) 
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Australia, as we have seen, if a lender has the requisite degree of 
knowledge of an unconscionable transaction (for example, between a 
husband and wife), it will itself be treated as acting unconscionably in 
relying on the transaction. A good illustration is also to be found from the 
Canadian jurisdiction in Shoppers Trust Co v Dynamic Homes Ltd.122 
Here, the husband obtained a large loan from the claimant which was 
secured by a mortgage over the family home, which was owned solely by 
the wife. The husband had persuaded her to sign the documents at the 
offices of a solicitor who was acting for both the claimant and the third 
party. The wife was illiterate, had virtually no knowledge of her husband's 
business affairs and was fearful of her husband. The solicitor did not tell 
her that there was no legal requirement for her to sign, what the 
consequences of her signing would be, or that she should obtain 
independent advice. The Ontario Court held that there was a fiduciary 
relationship between the solicitor and the wife, which obliged the former 
to ensure that the wife fully understood the nature and consequences of 
her actions and to advise her to seek independent advice. The transaction 
was unconscionable because it was improvident (the wife received no 
benefit under the mortgage) and also because the husband (and the 
solicitor) had taken advantage of their dominant position over the wife. 
Significantly also, it was unconscionable to permit the claimant (as 
lender) to take advantage of the mortgage in the absence of proper 
independent advice. Although admittedly such an approach still depends 
on notice (and, therefore, broadly similar to the test enunciated by the 
House of Lords in Barclays Bank v O'Brien),123 “it focuses more directly 
upon the unconscionable conduct of the bank instead of the indirect test of 
notice of the undue influence of a third party”.124 
 
8 CONCLUSION 
 
A radical overhaul of the doctrines of undue influence and 
unconscionable dealings, with a view to providing a single, coherent 
principle justifying equity's intervention to prevent the exploitation of the 
vulnerable, is much needed.  
First, it can be argued that the current division of undue influence into 
two distinct categories (with the further refinement of the presumed 
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category into class 2a and 2b cases) is unnecessarily technical and 
complex. The additional element in the presumed undue influence cases 
(both class 2a and 2b) of the need to show that the transaction was 
manifestly disadvantageous to the complainant has only added to this 
complexity and, as we have seen, has been criticised both academically 
and judicially. A simplified doctrine (which would get rid of these 
artificial categories) could be achieved, as Capper has suggested, by 
bringing together the common threads of: (1) relational inequality; (2) 
transactional imbalance; and (3) unconscionable conduct under one 
unified concept of unconscionable use of power.  
Secondly, the adoption of a universal umbrella of unconscionable 
conduct has the advantage of affording the courts with a greater degree of 
flexibility in determining the outcome of a particular case. This was 
recognised by Nourse LJ in Bank of Credit and Commerce International 
(Overseas) Ltd v Akindele, 125  in the context of liability for knowing 
receipt, where he stated126 that a single test based on unconscionability 
ought to avoid the difficulties of “definition and allocation to which the 
previous categorisations [of knowledge] have led”. Significantly, his 
Lordship also considered that such a test would make it easier for the 
courts to give common-sense decisions in the commercial context, in 
which most knowing receipt claims are made.  
Thirdly, there is much to be said, as we have seen, for aligning undue 
influence with the related doctrine of unconscionable bargains. The two 
doctrines have common characteristics and it seems unduly artificial to 
treat them as distinct and separate claims arising, in many cases, out of the 
same set of facts. In particular, unconscionable conduct is already clearly 
evident in actual undue influence cases and is (by definition) an essential 
feature of unconscionable bargain cases. Although, in the presumed undue 
influence category, coercion and abuse may not always be present, 
nevertheless, many of the cases on unconscionable dealing also concern 
(as we have seen) little more than passive acceptance of benefits received 
under unconscionable circumstances. The resultant confusion has resulted 
in several cases being characterised as falling under undue influence 
instead of being treated as cases of unconscionability.127 The degree of 
overlap between the two doctrines, as well as the potential for confusion 
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in terms of bringing the appropriate litigation, has prompted Moore128 to 
observe recently: 
 
“A single principle which rescinds a contract made by a party 
exploiting seriously constrained decisional autonomy of the other 
would unify yet faithfully preserve the rationale and operation of 
the discrete doctrines of ... undue influence, and 
unconscionability. Recognising it would enhance the law’s 
coherence, clarify and streamline invalidity claims, and facilitate 
their consistent adjudication.” 
 
Fourthly, as noted earlier, the notion of unconscionability could easily 
be extended to embrace the liability of a third party in circumstances 
where it has actual or constructive notice that the loan transaction is 
tainted with an equitable wrong. Thus, the requisite degree of knowledge 
of an unconscionable transaction (for example, between a husband and 
wife) could itself be treated as acting unconscionably in relying on the 
transaction. This, it is submitted, would provide a welcome degree of 
symmetry between say, a wife's right to have a transaction set aside as 
against her husband on the grounds of her husband's undue influence and 
the unenforceability of the transaction against a third party bank or other 
lender who itself had acted unconscionably in relation to the transaction.  
Finally, there is the more general point that an assimilation of undue 
influence with unconscionable bargains would reflect the growing judicial 
trend towards accepting unconscionability as a useful unifying tool in 
modern trust law. As we have seen, the notion of unconscionable dealing 
as an underlying principle has already been adopted in the context of 
proprietary estoppel, knowing receipt liability, imperfect transfers of 
property, joint venture arrangements, secret trusts and mutual wills. The 
lesson here is that, in each of these contexts, the principle of 
unconscionability has provided the courts with the opportunity not just to 
rationalise the underlying nature of liability but, more importantly, to 
provide a valuable contribution in defining its precise reach and scope. As 
Delany and Ryan have concluded:129 
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“In the final analysis, then, it seems fittingly ironic that a unifying 
theme of the use of the unconscionability principle across a wide 
spectrum of very different contexts is that this allegedly 
impenetrable and hopelessly obscure principle should itself 
emerge as a clarifying force, casting fresh light upon and 
signalling new directions in equitable relief.” 
 
One obvious objection to any such process of amalgamation is the 
notion that this would lead to considerable uncertainty in our law. The 
uncertainty argument should not, however, be overstated. As with most 
other doctrines, a broader notion of unconscionability in the context of 
undue influence and unconscionable bargains would inevitably lead to the 
laying down of more specific guidelines for determining its application. 
At the same time, there would be a more systematic approach to the 
development of the requisite principles which would avoid the current 
overlap and confusion arising from two related, but currently distinct 
doctrines. Phang puts the matter succinctly:130 
 
“If, indeed, this approach of amalgamation or consolidation is 
adopted, the many  problems pertaining to linkages both amongst 
the various categories of undue influence as well as amongst the 
doctrines of ... undue influence and unconscionability would 
vanish, and courts could set about the task of focusing their 
attention on bringing the new doctrine to legal maturity.” 
 
Capper also has addressed the uncertainty argument cogently:131 
 
“A merged doctrine of undue influence/unconscionable bargain 
would not, it is submitted, generate further uncertainty than exists 
already in the common law. On the contrary, by allowing the 
courts to make a fresh start with conceptually clear principles, a 
much more functional doctrine could be created by judicial 
decisions which begin from the same sensible premises.” 
 
A good example can be taken from the emerging doctrine of knowing 
receipt liability. Here, recent case law has sought to clarify the degree of 
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fault or culpability necessary to trigger the doctrine. In Credit Agricole 
Corp and Investment Bank v Papadimitriou,132 Lord Sumption observed133 
that “whether a person claims to be a bona fide purchaser of assets 
without notice of a prior interest in them, or disputes a claim to make him 
accountable as a constructive trustee on the footing of knowing receipt, 
the question of what constitutes notice or knowledge is the same”. Thus, a 
party will be liable for knowing receipt where he should either have 
appreciated that a proprietary right existed, or have made inquiries or 
sought advice which would have revealed the probable existence of such a 
right.134 Moreover, inquiries must be made if there is a serious possibility 
of a third party having such a right, or if the facts are such as to give 
serious need to question the propriety of the transaction. 135  As one 
commentator136 has observed, this guidance is not without significance in 
helping “to resolve some of the uncertainty about when a bank will be 
liable to account as a knowing recipient and ... contribut[ing] to a better 
understanding of what is unconscionable in this context”. 
The point here is that, although the concept of unconscionability may 
be expressed in fairly broad terms, the courts would exercise the new 
jurisdiction according to well-defined principles. This, as we have seen, is 
the approach taken in the Commonwealth jurisdictions, where the courts 
do not administer a general power to set aside transactions simply 
because, in the eyes of the judiciary, they appear to be harsh or unfair. On 
the contrary, far from acting in a wholly discretionary function, the courts 
have formulated specific tests for determining when a transaction should 
be set aside for unconscionability. There is no reason to suppose that a 
similar approach would not be adopted in this country. If, however, the 
English courts are reluctant to undertake what is perceived to be 
essentially a function of Parliament in developing the law, 137  serious 
thought should be given to rationalising this area of law by means of 
legislative intervention.138  
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Contracts Regulations 1999 (formerly 1994). In the United States, a broad 
doctrine of substantive unconscionability is partly statutory, deriving from article 
2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code, and also common law based in those 
states where the Code does not apply. 
